ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
he objectives of this study are to confirm theories and findings of previous empirical research on stock recommendations in analysts' reports, and to examine the significance of revisions to stock recommendations in the Korean capital market from various points of view. Analysts act as information intermediaries in the capital market, and their reports alleviate the information asymmetry between enterprises and information users (Asquith et al., 2005) . These reports provide critical help to studies of the capital market because they provide useful insight into and understanding of the behavior of market participants that is difficult to observe directly. Since analysts offer earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for many enterprises in their reports, the accuracy of the forecasting activities they provide directly affects the reputation and determines the reward of those firms. Investors also make decisions about individual investments and evaluate the performance of analysts and firms in which they own stock based on the accuracy of the data provided in analysts' reports. From the viewpoint of investors, not that of the capital market, specific investment decision-making is based on analysts' reports. Potential investors either buy company stocks or adopt a wait-and-see attitude depending on what they learn from these reports. Stockholders exhibit specific behavioral patterns such as selling their stocks or reducing their holdings based on these reports. Thus, many decisions may be based on the forecasts of analysts, and behavioral patterns may also vary according to analysts' specific stock recommendations.
In this study, an overview is provided of earnings forecasts and stock recommendations of analysts as information intermediaries in the Korean capital market. Several studies have systematically examined the effects of report content on capital markets, the characteristics of earnings forecasts, and the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. Factors influencing decision-making have also been well studied. In addition, many studies on stock recommendations have focused on the informational content of stock recommendations. However, no systematic analysis of the characteristics of stock recommendations and related decision-making factors has been conducted.
Five stock recommendations have been identified in previous studies: "Strong Buy", "Buy", "Hold", "Underweight", and "Sell". These are commonly used in analysts' reports. In a sizable percentage of these reports, however, no stock recommendation is made; this area of the report is left blank (4.55%). In this study, a blank stock Stock recommendations by analysts provide summary information about the intrinsic value of a company. In previous studies, informational content was verified by the abnormal returns obtained when an investment was made according to stock recommendations. Womack (1996) and Elton et al. (1986) reported that high abnormal returns could be obtained for six months after analysts gave the "Buy" recommendation or the recommendation grade was raised. Barber et al. (2001) used a consensus of stock investment grades from analysts and showed that high investment returns could be obtained by establishing a "Buy" portfolio including companies with the highest consensus and a "Sell" portfolio including companies with the lowest consensus. In Korean studies, Kim and Eum (2006) verified that the effects of stock recommendations and adjustment are already reflected in the target stock price, and that changes in stock recommendations result in a greater stock price reaction. Jeong and Lim (2005) showed that cumulative abnormal returns are dependent on the stock recommendations of analysts and their earnings forecasts, and that a high cumulative abnormal return is achieved when a "Buy" recommendation and high earnings forecasts are issued simultaneously. In summary, the results of Korean and international studies are similar in that the usefulness of stock recommendations corresponds significantly to the stock price at the time of disclosure. This suggests that analysts' reports can be used as a strategic index during investor decision-making about investment in a specific stock.
Other studies have investigated the role of consensus information in achieving excess returns based on the stock recommendations of analysts. Stock recommendation consensus can be expressed as a numerical value: the average value for stock recommendations during a certain period for a specific company. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) showed that a positive abnormal return could be obtained by establishing a portfolio using consensus values, but they concluded that the earnings rate was insufficient if future earnings rates and other reliable variables were extracted. Kho and Kim (2007) showed that no abnormal return could be achieved when the portfolio was established using a consensus of information on "Sell" and "Buy" recommendations in the Korean capital market. They also pointed out that a conflict of interest exists in the business relationship between analysts and companies with regard to the tendency always to recommend "Buy." In situations where the major recommendation is "Buy," the consensus stock recommendation may not have additional informational content. However, if the qualitative characteristics of stock recommendations are controlled so that genuine "Buy" and "Sell" recommendations can be distinguished, the consensus information may have additional value. Most previous studies have focused on the informational content of the recommendation grade, the grade change itself, or the consensus. This is the first study to investigate the factors related to the decision to provide "No Response", or to leave the stock recommendation blank in analysts' forecast reports. The following section presents the hypotheses of this study and provides a more detailed explanation. However, unlike in previous studies, the conditions under which a report is filed in which the stock recommendation remains blank are also considered in this study, and "No Response" is included as one of the classifications.
Analysts provide various kinds of forecast information using their information-gathering and forecasting abilities, which are superior to those of general investors. Information users make investment decisions based on the forecast information provided by analysts (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979; Jeong and Lim, 2005) . Analysts analyze public information that is available to everyone in the market using their professional forecasting capabilities. Analysts acquire information from managers through company visits and interviews. Due to information asymmetry between managers and external information users, financial analysts' reports constitute a very important source of private information. Analysts know the importance of these reports, and strive to provide good recommendations. Therefore, in the absence of an alternative motive for leaving the stock recommendation blank, we can speculate that choosing the "No Response" option indicates that the analyst has insufficient information. Analysts must take into account the effect of their recommendations on their reputation because their performance is evaluated based on the accuracy of their analysts' reports. If analysts are not confident of their own forecasts due to lack of information about a company, they may leave the stock recommendation blank. For analysts to make accurate forecasts, both public data and private information about the insider are necessary. More accurate analysts' reports alleviate the information asymmetry between general investors and companies. However, access to private information differs among individual analysts and the agencies to which they belong. According to the structure of capital markets, market expectations are formed through stock recommendations. Therefore, an analyst working for an affiliated broker (a Chaebol) may be able to gather more private information on the broker's affiliated companies. These analysts are in a superior informational position. They may use the "No Response" recommendation less often due to their abundance of public and private information about companies. The Clute Institute Analysts' forecasts depend on both the quantity of public and private information and the ability to interpret that information. Mikhail et al. (1997) , Clement (1999), and Jacob et al. (1999) reported that concerns about experience, ability, and task complexity and environmental factors related to analyst agencies affect the accuracy of the earnings forecast. The specific results of these studies showed an association between continuous service years (analysts with many years of working experience) and high accuracy in earnings forecasts. Stickel (1992) reported that analysts who were awarded for their work made more accurate earnings forecasts than those of other analysts who had not been rewarded. In addition, changes in earnings forecasts had a greater effect on stock prices. Leone and Wu (2002) also reported that analysts with superior earnings forecasting abilities were more likely to be selected for their superior skills, and that their strong abilities were maintained even after their selection. This suggests that the earnings forecasts calculated by the best analysts may be used more often by investors. Thus, analysts with long service careers or those who are rewarded for their superior work produce higher-quality reports because of their superior personal ability to interpret the given information. Therefore, due to their superior ability, these analysts are expected to leave the stock recommendation blank less often. Based on these observations, the following hypotheses are put forward.
Hypothesis 1-1:
An analyst who is in a Chaebol (an affiliated brokerage) will leave the stock recommendation blank ("No Response") less frequently than one who is not in a Chaebol.
Hypothesis 1-2:
An analyst with superior forecasting ability will leave the stock recommendation blank ("No Response") less frequently than one without superior forecasting ability.
According to Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) , if sellers have access to better information about product quality than their consumers and the cost of verifiably disclosing this information is zero, sellers will always disclose. This occurs because rational consumers will associate non-disclosure with the lowest quality. These studies showed that managers may not be willing to provide certain types of information in certain circumstances. However, in these studies, the statistical analysis was limited to specific events where the managers consistently gave no response. On the other hand, in cases where analysts omit certain information from their analysts' reports, as in this study, the date of the "No Response" event can be determined and all other information except the stock recommendation can be verified. Thus, the reaction of investors to the "No Response" recommendation can be directly observed. Market reaction to "No Response" can also be monitored. In this study, the reaction of investors to "No Response," which has hitherto been proven only theoretically, is actually verified. Hence, another hypothesis is established: Hypothesis 1-3: Change in the stock recommendation from a grade to "No Response" has informational content.
RESEARCH DESIGN Variable Settings

Ratio of "No Response" to Other Recommendations
In order to measure how often a specific analyst leaves the stock recommendation blank (i.e., "No Response") with regard to a given company, the variable Null cons is defined. The data for the variable Null cons are established for all analysts, companies, and years. Thus, the variable reflects the number of "No Response" instances for each analyst with regard to each analyzed company in each year divided by the number of analysts' reports. The ratio of "No Response" to other stock recommendations in the disclosed analysts' reports is higher for analysts with large values for Null cons . The value of this variable is 0.1 if the "No Response" option is chosen in one out of ten reports. The variable Null cons is defined as follows. The Clute Institute
Cumulative Abnormal Return
In this study, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is defined as follows, and the following marketadjusted model is used in which the market return is benchmarked.
(1) R it : the stock return of company i on day t R mt : the stock return of the market portfolio on day t
The abnormal return of individual sample companies (AR it ) computed in the equation above is accumulated to calculate CAR, as shown in the following equation:
This calculation of CAR is used as a dependent variable in the model to test Hypothesis 1-3 in order to verify the informational content of the change in recommendation to "No Response." Assuming an efficient stock market, the stock price reflects all disclosed information of the past and present. In this study, it is assumed that the information used to create the stock recommendations disclosed by analysts is immediately reflected in the stock price. Hence, a relatively narrow time window (−1, 0 and +1 day) is set for the analysis to verify the variables for informational content and changes in the stock return.
Chaebol Affiliation Dummy
Chaebol groups in this study include the thirty largest business groups identified by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. The forecasting activities of analysts are affected not only by personal factors such as the number of years of service and forecasting experience in specific industries and companies, but also by the characteristics of the firms to which the analysts belong, the stakeholder relationship between the affiliated stock firms and the target companies of the analysis, and the characteristics of the ownership structure and governance structure of the analyzed companies (Mikhail et al., 1997; Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999) . Analysts are generally affiliated with firms that publish financial reports. They are evaluated by the very firms that they analyze. Hence, they have access to private information about the firms they analyze. Companies affiliated with business groups (known as Chaebols in Korea) may all be evaluated by the same analyst, who is familiar with the insiders of the group. For example, an analyst working for Samsung Securities Co., Ltd. may provide very effective analyses due to access to private information during the analysis of the parent company, Samsung Electronics. Therefore, in this study, a proxy is utilized for the information environment of the analyst in the form of the variable ChaeAff dum , as follows:
ChaeAff dum : 1 if an analyst affiliated with a stock firm belonging to a Chaebol group reports on the stock recommendation for a company in the same Chaebol group; 0, otherwise.
Ability
In this study, the number of years of service and analyst ranking are used as measures of forecasting ability. Mikhail et al. (1997) , Clement (1999) , and Jacob et al. (1999) showed that the earnings forecasts of analysts with many years of experience (continuous service years) were highly accurate due to their skill at performing forecasting activities repeatedly. Thus, the variable Anal age is defined in this study as follows:
Anal age : continuous service years as an analyst Analyst reputation is measured based on the ranking of analysts in each industry as published in the Maekyung Economy magazine, the Maeil Business Newspaper, the Hankyung Business Weekly, and the Korea Economic Daily newspaper. These weekly magazines publish rankings data twice a year. Rankings for the first half of the year are published in July based on the achievements of analysts between January and June, and those for the second half of the year are published in January based on their achievements between July and December. The top five analysts in each industry are generally recognized in business circles and the media as powerful "star" analysts Factors that are expected to affect the "No Response" ratio include the total market value (MV), debt ratio (LEV), return on equity (ROE), reports of loss (NGE), BETA, coverage (Coverage), EPS (earnings per share) revision rate (EPS), and stock price revision rate (PRICE). MV, LEV, NGE, and BETA were chosen to control for the information environment of the target company of the analyst. If a company's total market price is low and the debt ratio is high, and if the company has reported a loss, the information environment of the company may be better than otherwise. If the value of BETA is greater, market volatility may be higher, and thus the information about that business may be less certain.
Several previous studies utilized analyst coverage as a proxy for the information environment of a company (McNichols and O'Brien, 1997; Lang et al., 2006) . In this study, we posit that the "No Response" option will be chosen less frequently by analysts of companies with greater coverage. ROE is the index that indicates the size of the return in comparison with the input equity capital. In this study, ROE is used to control for the return of a target company.
In addition to stock recommendations, analysts' reports contain earnings forecasts and stock price forecasts. These control variables are set using the ratio of change with reference to the forecasted values immediately previous to a given forecast in order to control for changes in the earnings and stock price forecasts.
The multiple regression equation used to test Hypothesis 1-3 is as follows. As described above, the independent variable, Null dum , verifies a change to the "No Response" option from one of the five previously described stock recommendations. The study model and the individual control variables are therefore defined as follows:
CAR (-1 
The major financial characteristics are the total market value (MV), debt ratio (LEV), return on equity (ROE), reports of loss (NGE), BETA, coverage (Coverage), EPS (earnings per share) revision rate (EPS), and stock price revision rate (PRICE). These variables have been employed in previous studies. The debt ratio is included among the variables in order to control for cases in which the influence of disclosures from companies with high debt ratios on the stock market return is insignificant or relatively weak (Aboody et al., 1999) . The total market value is included to control for the effect of a company's information environment on the stock market return (Collins and Kothari, 1989) . Conflicting results in previous research precluded advanced determination of the sign of the effect of the debt ratio and total assets on the market reaction. Reports of loss are included in order to confirm the results of a previous study, which stated that positive and negative accounts differ in quality (Hayn, 1995) . BETA, which is derived from the monthly stock market return, is used to measure risk. A higher value for BETA suggests a negative regression coefficient due to greater uncertainty about a firm's future expected rate of return and the corresponding market reaction (Kim et al., 2013) . Because analyst coverage is used as a proxy for the information environment, higher coverage (indicating a better information environment) results in a stronger shortterm market reaction in an efficient market. ROE, the index representing the earnings rate with reference to equity capital, is used to control for the rate of return of the target companies. As in the model for Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2, the control variables are set using the ratio of change with reference to the forecasted values immediately previous to a given forecast in order to control for changes in earnings and stock price forecasts.
Data for twelve years (2000 to 2011) are used that satisfy the above conditions. To minimize the effect of outliers, the top and bottom 1% of values for all independent and dependent variables are winsorized. In total, 46,115 firm-year-analyst observations are used for testing Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2. An additional 381,235 firm-yearanalyst reporting event date observations are also used for testing Hypothesis 1-3.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for each group are shown in Panels A and B of Table 2 . This table presents mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values. The observation period is from 2000 to 2011. All key variables are described herein.
In Panel A, the dependent variable is Null cons , which is measured based on analyses listed in the FnDataGuidePro. Null cons has a mean (median) value of 0.1357 (0.0000) and maximum and minimum values of 1 and 0, respectively. The mean (median) of the Chaebol-affiliated dummy (ChaeAff dum ) variable is 0.0124 (0.0000). The mean (median) value of the best analyst dummy (Best) is 0.1835 (0.0000), while the mean (median) number of continuous years of service (Anal age ) is 3.8960 (3.0000). The mean value (median) for market value (MV) is 26.9550 (26.7043), which is KRW 509 trillion (KRW 396 trillion). The mean and median values for the variable LEV are 2.2808 and 1.3717, respectively, suggesting that the average total liability of our sample represents 228% of total firm equity. The ROE variable has a mean value of 0.1071 and a median value of 0.1200. The mean value for NGE is 0.0997, indicating that the proportion of firms reporting loss is 10% on average. The mean value for the BETA variable is 0.9809. The Coverage variable has a mean value of 17.1046, indicating that on average, 17 analysts perform financial analyses for the firms in this study. The mean values for the D_EPS_FORE and D_PRICE_FORE variables are −0.0070 and 0.0059, respectively. The mean of the KOSPI dummy variable is 0.6708, that is, 67.08% of observations are from firms with shares traded on the KOSPI; otherwise, they are traded on the KOSDAQ.
In Panel B, the dependent variable is CAR (−1,1) , measured based on analyst reports from the FnDataGuidePro database. The mean (median) three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR (−1,1) ) is 0.19% (0.01%). Null dum has a mean (median) value of 0.0418 (0.0000) and maximum and minimum values of 1 and 0, respectively. This means that the proportion of "No Response" reports is 4.18% of the full sample. The mean value (median) for market value (MV) is 27.5071 (27.0000), which is KRW 883 trillion (KRW 532 trillion). The mean and median values for the leverage (LEV) variable are 2.1042 and 1.2500, respectively. The return on equity (ROE) variable has a mean value of 0.1119 and a median value of 0.1223. The proportion of firms reporting loss (NGE) is 9.27% on average. The mean value for the BETA variable is 0.9703. The average number of analysts' reports (Coverage) is 19.9891. The mean values for the D_EPS_FORE and D_PRICE_FORE variables are −0.0062 and 0.0065, respectively. The mean of the KOSPI dummy variable is 0.7621; that is, 76.21% of observations are from firms with shares traded on the KOSPI; otherwise, they are traded on the KOSDAQ. Before hypothesis testing, the Pearson correlation coefficients of the key variables in the multiple regression equations are determined. These are reported in Table 3 . In the table, Panel A lists correlations from the firm-year-analyst dataset in terms of Null cons , and Panel B represents that from the firm-year-event date dataset analyzed in terms of CAR (−1,1) .
In Panel A, the correlation coefficient between Null cons and ChaeAff dum is significant and negative (−0.0384) at a confidence level of 1%. A positive relationship is evident between Null cons and analyst ability (Best and Anal age ). These results show that as values for ChaeAff dum , Best, and Anal age increase in analysts' reports, the ratio of "No Response" to other responses decreases. However, because these results are based on simple correlation analyses, and considering that other variables affecting these variables are not controlled, these results cannot be generalized. Looking at the correlations between independent variables, all correlation coefficients are <0.3, which means that the chances of a multicollinearity problem are relatively low. In addition, the correlation coefficients between MV and COVERAGE are 0.7006 and 0.6929 in panels A and B, respectively. These values are high and positive. If MV and COVERAGE are analyzed together in one model, multicollinearity may result. Thus, the VIF (variance inflation factor) value of each model is determined. The highest VIF values in the models (in tests of Hypotheses 1-1 and 1-2) are <5.0 (3.58 and 3.53, respectively); thus, no serious multicollinearity problems are identified among the independent variables in the model.
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The Clute Institute Table 4 displays the results of testing of Hypothesis 1-1 representing differences in the proportion of "No Response" reports between Chaebol-affiliated analysts and non-Chaebol-affiliated analysts. The results of the multivariate testing of Hypothesis 1-1 are based on the estimation in Equation (3). The dependent variable in the model is Null dum , and the key independent variable is ChaeAff dum. The results are as follows (Table 4) . : ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
The signs of the coefficients of the included variables are notable. In the first column of Table 4 , characteristics of analyst reports such as Coverage, D_EPS_FORE, and D_PRICE_FORE are represented. Controlling for these characteristics, the t-statistic of ChaeAff dum is −8.90 (p = 0.01). The second column includes the results with the financial characteristics of firms such as market value (MV) and debt ratio (LEV) added to the first column. Controlling for firms' financial characteristics, the t-statistic of ChaeAff dum is −8.46, which is significant at the 1% level. The last column displays all related control variables included in the model, such as ROE, NGE, and BETA. In this case, the t-statistic of ChaeAff dum is −8.45, which is also significant at the 1% level. In all three analyses, the coefficients have significant negative values (β 1 = −0.5810, −0.5565, and −0.5550, respectively). These negative coefficients suggest that the proportion of "No Response" recommendations is lower for Chaebol-affiliated analysts. Analysts in Chaebol brokerages are likely to have access to superior information sources compared to the data sources of other non-Chaebol brokerages, since Chaebols collect and retain huge amounts of data from various industries. Therefore, Chaebol-affiliated analysts have confidence in their own forecast values. These results suggest that analysts with lack of information tend to leave the stock recommendation area blank in their reports ("No Response"). Thus, Hypothesis 1-1 is supported. : ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
The signs of the coefficients of the included variables are notable. In the first column of panel A, characteristics of analyst reports such as Coverage, D_EPS_FORE, and D_PRICE_FORE are represented. Controlling for these characteristics, the t-statistics of Best and Anal age are −18.84 (p = 0.01) and −20.53 (p = 0.01), respectively. The second column includes the results with financial characteristics of firms such as market value (MV) and debt ratio (LEV) added to the first column. Controlling for these financial characteristics, the t-statistics of the two key independent variables are −18.38 and −20.28, which are significant at the 1% level. The last column displays all related control variables included in the model, such as ROE, NGE, and BETA. In this case, the tstatistics of Best and Anal age are −18.33 and −20.10, which are also significant at the 1% level. In all three analyses, the coefficients have significant negative values. These negative coefficients suggest that the proportion of "No Response" is lower for top analysts. These results suggest that less capable analysts tend to leave the stock recommendation area blank in their reports ("No Response"). Thus, Hypothesis 1-2 is supported. Table 6 displays the results of testing of Hypothesis 1-3 representing changes in recommendation from one of the five common stock recommendations to "No Response." It reports the results of the multivariate testing of Hypothesis 1-3 based on the estimation in Equation (6). The dependent variable in the model is CAR (−1,1) , and the key independent variable is Null dum. The results are as follows (Table 6 ). : ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test
The signs of the coefficients of the included variables are notable. In the second column of Table 6 , the tstatistic of Null dum2 is −1.92 (p = 0.10), which is significant at the 10% level. It indicates that stock returns from firms with "No Response" in the stock recommendations area of the financial report are significantly lower than those from firms with "Buy" recommendations. The second column displays all related control variables included in the model. The t-statistic of the Null dum3 variable is 2.35, which is significant at the 5% level. It indicates that stock returns from firms with "No Response" in the stock recommendations area are significantly higher than those from firms with "Hold" recommendations. Thus, a change in the stock recommendation grade to "No Response" provides specific incremental informational content. This supports Hypothesis 1-3.
CONCLUSION
Analysts' reports act as information intermediaries in the capital market, and thus alleviate information asymmetry between enterprises and information users (Asquith et al., 2005) . Stock recommendations by analysts provide summaries of information about the intrinsic value of a company. In previous studies, informational content was verified depending on whether an abnormal return could be obtained if an investment was made according to stock recommendations. Analysts' reports provide critical information for research on the capital market and useful insight into the behavior of market participants, which is difficult to observe directly. Since analysts offer earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for multiple enterprises in their reports, the accuracy of their forecast data directly influences their reputation and reward. Investors also make decisions on individual investments and evaluate the performance of analysts and firms based on the accuracy of the data that analysts provide. Thus, evaluation of various aspects of analysts' reports may be helpful to a variety of players in the business world.
